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A close-run thing? Accounting for changing overall turnout in UK General Elections 
 
Abstract:  
Turnout at UK General Elections has remained stubbornly below post-war levels in the new 
millennium. Between 1950 and 1997, official turnout averaged 76% and never fell below 
71% (in 1997); since 2001 average turnout has been 12 percentage points lower, at 64%. We 
investigate several possible explanations for that decline: the lack of competitiveness in 
recent contests; an increase in ideological similarity between the major parties; and partisan 
dealignment. Although electoral competitiveness affects turnout, and in the expected 
directions, it cannot readily account for the sudden drop in participation after 2000. But there 
is evidence that aggregate levels of partisanship are important: the unusually low turnout 
levels since 2000 are associated with unusually low levels of partisanship, and there are signs 
RIDµWKUHVKROGHIIHFW¶ 
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A close-run thing? Accounting for changing overall turnout in UK General Elections 
 
Participation rates at recent UK General Elections have been substantially below past turnout 
levels. Between 1950 and 1997 official turnout averaged 76% and never fell below 71% (in 
1997). Since 2000, however, average turnout has been about 12 percentage points lower, at 
64%. The lowest turnout (59%) came in 2001. At each subsequent General Election it 
recovered somewhat, but at 69% in 2017 it is still some way below even the lowest turnout of 
the late twentieth century.1 
 
Several possible explanations of changing turnout have been offered. One possibility is that 
less competitive elections depress political participation (e.g. Blais, 2000). Another possible 
explanation concerns how ideologically distinct the major parties appear to be from each 
other: the more similar they are, goes the argument, the less that rides on the election result 
and hence the lower the turnout (Pattie and Johnston, 2001; Heath, 2007). A third often-
mooted H[SODQDWLRQFRQFHUQVSDUWLVDQGHDOLJQPHQWDVYRWHUV¶DWWDFKPHQWV to political parties 
become less intense, the incentive to vote diminishes (Heath, 2007).2 To what extent do these 
explanations account for the decline and partial recovery of aggregate national turnout in the 
UK? In this paper, we examine the evidence.  
 
Explaining turnout change 
 
Rational voter theories from Downs (1957) on stress the importance of electoral 
competitiveness as an influence on turnout, especially in plurality electoral systems such as 
the UK¶V. The more certain an election result seems in advance, either nationally or in the 
YRWHU¶VKRPHFRQVWLWXHQF\(or both), the lower the incentives for voters to take part, whether 
they support the anticipated winner or loser. Parties focus their mobilisation and campaign 
efforts on close contests in marginal seats, boosting turnout there (Green and Gerber, 2015: 
John and Brannan, 2008; Fieldhouse et al., 2013; Pattie and Johnston, 2003; Johnston and 
Pattie, 2014; Hartman et al., 2017; Denver and Hands, 1985; Pattie and Johnston, 2001). 
 
At the national level, too, elections vary substantially in how close the competition seems to 
the electorate, as illustrated by plotting national turnout against the absolute percentage point 
difference between Labour and Conservative in the final public pre-election opinion poll 
from each of the major polling companies at every UK general election since 1945 (figure 
1).3 The 1992 election was, before the event, widely perceived to be too close to call: not 
surprisingly turnout then was, at 78%, relatively high. Five yearVODWHU/DERXU¶V 1997 
landslide victory had been widely anticipated long before the election: at 71%, turnout in that 
contest was the lowest of the post-war period up to that point. Analyses of variations in 
national-level turnout between 1950 and 1997 show that how close the major parties were to 
                                                 
1
 7KHFKDQJHRYHUWLPHLQWXUQRXWPLJKWEHVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWWRWKDWVXJJHVWHGE\WKHµRIILFLDO¶ILJXUHVDQG
the difference may vary over time (Electoral Commission, 2016, p. 6; Mellon et al. 2018). However, Mellon et 
DO¶VµEHVWHVWLPDWHV¶RIFRUUected turnout in recent UK General Elections show broadly the same turnout 
trends (albeit at different levels) as the official figures. 
2
 Generational replacement provides a fourth possible explanation. Over time, younger generations replace older 
ones in the electorate. But if the new entrants to the electorate are less inclined to turn out than those leaving it, 
generational replacement may lead to an overall decline in turnout (Franklin, 2004; Grasso, 2016). To study the 
generational replacement effect adequately would, however, require a somewhat different analytical approach to 
that adopted here. 
3
 Polling data for elections between 1945 and 2010 are taken from Rallings and Thrasher (2012): after 2010, 
GDWDDUHWDNHQIURP$QWKRQ\:HOOV¶UK Polling Report website (http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/). 
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each other in the polls just prior to the election was a strong predictor of national turnout: the 
closer their poll standing, the higher the turnout (Pattie and Johnston, 2001).  
 
Prima facie, the tightness of the national contest provides a plausible explanation for the 
further decline in turnout at the 2001 election (another widely anticipated Labour landslide) 
DQGWKHVORZUHFRYHU\LQWXUQRXWVLQFH/DERXU¶VOHDGZDVVHULRXVO\HURGHGLQDQG
before both the 2010 and 2015 elections many polls suggested a close contest between 
Conservative and Labour. In 2017, meanwhile, although the election outcome seemed a 
foregone conclusion at the outset of the campaign (with a very large Conservative win 
expected), the race narrowed rapidly as the campaign progressed (Denver, 2018, 14). Even 
so, turnout, though higher than 2001, remained below even the late twentieth century low 
point of 1997. National competitiveness alone cannot fully explain the changing pattern.  
 
A different measure of how competitive an election might be is provided by the proportion of 
constituencies which are at risk of changing hands in any given election. Where the 
incumbent party regularly wins by a wide margin, the seat is unlikely to change hands. Other 
constituencies are held by much smaller margins: a relatively small shift in votes between 
parties there could change the local winner. The more seats that are marginals, the more 
responsive the election is likely to be to small shifts in party support. And the more 
responsive the electoral system, other things being equal, the higher we might expect turnout 
to be. As the number of marginal constituencies in the UK has fluctuated over time, this is a 
potential reason for declining turnout. 
 
To illustrate this variation for each election between 1959 and 2017, we use Curtice¶V (2010, 
2015, 2018) calculation of how many Conservative-Labour marginals there were after the 
previous election (figure 2).4 Since the late 1950s, the general trend in the number of 
Conservative-Labour marginals has been downwards, with a particularly steep fall in the 
early 1970s. Again, the decline in the capacity of the electoral system to respond to small 
fluctuations in party support does not appear to explain turnout across the time series. 
 
A second potential explanation for variations in national turnout levels is the size of the 
ideological divide between the Labour and Conservative parties (Pattie and Johnston, 2001; 
Heath, 2007). The more distinctive their political positions and policies, the more 
consequential that election result might be perceived to be for shaping the future direction of 
public policy. In contrast, WKHFORVHUWKHWZRSDUWLHV¶SRVLWLRQVVHHPWREHWRHDFKRWKHUWKH
less it might matter which emerges in the lead: it is harder to become interested over different 
variants of the same basic programme than over radically different visions of the national 
future. 
 
Over time, %ULWDLQ¶V two largest parties¶SROLF\DJHQGDV have converged and diverged (as 
illustrated by how their election manifestos have been scored on a left-right scale (figure 3 ± 
data from the Manifesto Project: Volkens et al., 2017). The 1950s and early 1960s saw broad 
political consensus, as the Conservatives accommodated themselves to the welfare state 
introduced by the 1945 Labour government (Kavanagh and Morris, 1989). During the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the ideological gap between the parties widened, as Labour moved to the left 
and the Conservatives to the right (Whiteley, 1983; Gamble, 1988). Repeated electoral 
defeats caused Labour to move back towards the centre ground in the late 1980s and early 
                                                 
4
 Curtice (2018, 31) defines Conservative-/DERXUPDUJLQDOVDV³VHDWVZKHUHQHLWKHU/DERXUQRUWKH
&RQVHUYDWLYHVZRXOGKDYHZRQPRUHWKDQRIWKHYRWHVFDVWIRU&RQVHUYDWLYHDQG/DERXUDORQH«LQWKH
event thaWQDWLRQDOO\WKHWZRSDUWLHVKDGZRQH[DFWO\WKHVDPHVKDUHRIWKHYRWHDWWKDWHOHFWLRQ´ 
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1990s, introducing a new period of convergence, a process confirmed after 2005 when the 
Conservatives in their turn responded to repeated electoral defeats by moving towards the 
centre (Shaw, 1994; Bale, 2016). More recently, in 2015 and 2017 (the latter under its new 
leader Jeremy Corbyn), Labour has once more shifted leftwards, widening the gap between 
the main parties again (Bale, 2015; Quinn, 2016; Dorey, 2017).  
 
We might expect changing ideological differentiation to lead to a decline in turnout during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (as the major parties converged) and an increase thereafter, as 
they began to diverge again. Analyses of the period up till 1997 suggest that the perceived 
difference between the major parties does affect turnout (Pattie and Johnston 2003; Heath, 
2007). However, the consensus years of the 1950s and 1960s are a major challenge to this 
perspective, as these were years of both convergence and relatively high turnouts. Again, this 
clearly cannot be the sole factor behind aggregate turnout trends. 
 
A third contender is the changing strength of partisan identification in Britain. Partisanship is 
a powerful influence on turnout (Jung, 2017; Heath, 2007). Those who identify strongly with 
a political party are more likely to turn out than those who either identify only weakly with 
one or do not identify with any party. But over time, the strength of party attachment has 
declined steadily in the UK (figure 4; Särlvik and Crewe, 1983; Clarke and Stewart, 1998; 
Denver et al., 2012). And while Heath (2007) shows that this process of partisan dealignment 
was one of the major factors underlying the decline in individual-level turnout, it does not 
neatly mirror the fluctuations in aggregate turnout over time.  
 
Testing the theories 
 
How well do these three arguments account for aggregate shifts in national turnout since the 
mid-1940s? There were 20 General Elections in the UK between 1945 and 2017.5 While we 
have data on turnout and the average absolute difference between Labour and Conservatives 
in the final polls for all 20 elections, we are not so fortunate with our other indicators. 
&XUWLFH¶VHVWLPDWHVRIWKHQXPEHURIPDUJLQDOFRQVWLWXHQFLHVDUHDYDLODEOHRQO\IRUWKH
elections between 1959 and 2017. British Election Study data on the proportion of very 
strong partisans in the electorate are available only for contests from 1964 on. As for the 
ideological distance between Labour and Conservatives, the Manifesto Project had not, at the 
time of writing, yet released left-ULJKWVFRUHVIRUWKHSDUWLHV¶PDQLIHVWRHVJLYLQJXV
data points for assessments of the aggregate effects of the ideological gap between the 
parties). Even so, as we demonstrate below, the patterns are striking. To conserve data as 
much as possible, we analyse the effect of each possible explanatory variable separately. 
 
 
Election competitiveness and turnout 
We begin by examining how close the national election competition between Labour and 
Conservatives seemed in the polls in the immediate run-up to the vote, using the average of 
the percentage point difference between the two parties LQWKHPDMRUSROOVWHUV¶ILQDOSXEOLF
polls at every election as our measure of electoral competitiveness. The smaller the absolute 
difference, the closer the election would have seemed to parties, commentators and voters. 
                                                 
5
 7KH8.¶V*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQZDVIRXJKWZKLOHWKHFRXQWU\ZDVVWLOOHPEURLOHGLQ:RUOG:DU7ZR$VD
result, many eligible voters were unable to vote, and the electoral rolls employed were unusually inaccurate 
(McCallum and Readman, 1947, 31-32): the turnout figure in that election is liable to be unusually misleading, 
therefore. All analyses reported in the paper have therefore been re-run excluding the 1945 result. The results 
are substantively unchanged. We therefore report analyse of the full period from 1945 to 2017. 
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Although there is a negative relationship between turnout and our measure of electoral 
competitiveness (figure 5a), it is weak. In a bivariate regression, the effect of absolute poll 
difference on turnout falls short of conventional levels of significance (though it is significant 
at p=0.10), and the model accounts for just 15% of the variation in turnout (table 1a, model 
I). 
 
So does the overall competitiveness of the national race really have little to do with national 
turnout levels? On closer inspection, it seems otherwise. Turnout clearly dropped after 2000. 
Fitting separate trend lines for the pre- and post-2000 periods suggests there were similar 
trends between turnout and competitiveness in both periods (figure 5b): while the fit appears 
stronger in the pre-2000 period, it is still noticeable in the post-millennium elections, as the 
trend lines are almost parallel. This is confirmed by two further regression models. In the first 
(table 1a, Model II), we add a dummy variable coded 1 if the election took place after 2000 
and 0 if it took place before then. Our rationale for including this dummy is based on the 
frequently-cited argument that, to a large extent, election turnout is a habitual activity, 
strengthened through repeated participation (Franklin, 2004). If this is the case, a sudden and 
substantial drop in turnout at an election is liable to have a lasting effect on later elections, as 
more electors enter the group which has lost the reinforcing effects of past participation.  
 
On including the dummy variable, the R2 value increases considerably, from just 15% of the 
variation in turnout to 82%, with both independent variables highly significant and correctly 
signed. Overall, the closer the election seemed in advance, the higher the turnout ± but with a 
substantial decline in turnout, whatever the level of competitiveness, in the 21st compared to 
the 20th century. 
 
That the effect of competitiveness on turnout was fundamentally the same both before and 
after 2000 is confirmed by our third model (table 1a, model III), which adds an interaction 
between the competitiveness measure and the post-2000 measure. That interaction (which 
should capture any differences in the effect of competitiveness on turnout in the different 
time periods) is statistically insignificant.  There is an underlying relationship between how 
competitive elections appear in advance of polling day, and how high the turnout is ± and that 
relationship has not really changed over time. While it can help us understand fluctuations in 
turnout from one contest to the next, however, it cannot account for the sudden drop in 
turnout after 2000.  
 
What of the changing responsiveness of the electoral system, as indexed by the shifting 
number of marginal seats in play in the run-up to each election? As we would expect, there is 
a broad positive relationship between the number of marginals at the previous election, and 
the turnout (figure 6a).6 However, the relationship is not statistically significant (table 1b, 
model I) and adding a simple control for pre- and post-2000 contests does not change matters 
(table 1, model II). Adding an interaction between pre/post-2000 and the number of 
marginals reveals something unexpected, however (figure 6b, and table 1b, model III). The 
interaction term is significant and negative, while the main effect of the number of marginals 
remains insignificant. The responsiveness of the electoral system had no discernible effect on 
turnout prior to 2000, but it did have an effect thereafter. The surprising suggestion is that the 
post-2000 effect actually runs counter to expectations. In the post-millennium contests, the 
                                                 
6
 Periodic reviews of constituency boundaries complicate the picture somewhat. New seats were adopted in the 
1950, 1955, February 1974, 1983, 1997, 2005 (in Scotland) and 2010 (in England, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
elections, making the number of marginals in the preceding contest a less accurate reflection of the state of party 
competition on the ground for these elections than would normally be the case. 
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greater the potential for the electoral system to be responsive to small fluctuations in party 
support (i.e. the more marginal seats that might change hands), the lower the turnout. 
 
Ideological distinctiveness and turnout 
:HXVHWKH0DQLIHVWR3URMHFW¶VHVWLPDWHVRIZKHUHHDch Labour and Conservative general 
election manifesto scores on a left-right scale to measure the absolute ideological difference 
between the two parties at each election from 1945 to 2015. A visual inspection suggests a 
weak positive effect (Figure 7a): in general, the further apart the parties were ideologically, 
the higher turnout tended to be. But the effect, while correctly signed, is not significant (table 
1c, model I).  
 
Fitting separate trend lines for the pre- and post-2000 periods suggests that the relationship is 
stronger after the millennium than before, and that the nature of the relationship changed 
(figure 7b). Before 2000, the trend line is very slightly negative, but after then it is clearly 
positive. But this is more apparent than real: while the dummy variable for post-2000 contest 
is significant (table 1c, model II), the interaction between it and the ideological difference 
measure is not (table 1c, model III). Although it is an intuitively appealing explanation of 
changing turnout, and of the fall in turnout after 2000, it does not pass empirical muster. 
 
Our analysis relies on the ideological difference between Conservative and Labour as 
assessed on the basis of their manifesto commitments (as scored by academic researchers). 
Some previous analyses have operationalised this in different ways, for instance, by relying 
RQYRWHUV¶DVVHVVPHQWVRIKRZIDr apart the parties are in a particular contest and find stronger 
evidence of a relationship between (perceived) ideological distinctiveness ± that is, µclear 
blue water¶ between the parties ± and higher turnout (e.g. Pattie and Johnston, 2003). It could 
be that what matters is not the actual policy and political differences but what voters perceive 
those differences to be (though we lack measures of this across time). 
 
Partisan attachment and turnout 
Finally, we examine the effect of aggregate strength of partisanship within the electorate on 
voter turnout. To measure partisan attachment, we use the percentage of respondents to 
successive British Election Study post-election face-to-IDFHVXUYH\VZKRUHSRUWDµYHU\
VWURQJ¶LGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKDSDUW\. That aggregate measure is positively related to turnout 
between 1964 and 2017: the more intensely partisan the electorate the higher the turnout 
(figure 8a). The effect is significant, and the r2 value is the highest for any of the bivariate 
models examined here: the partisan identity measure accounts for a third of the variation in 
turnout (table 1d, model I). 
 
That said, the scatterplot reveals that the relationship between turnout and the percentage with 
a very strong partisan identification is strikingly non-linear and a quadratic equation (with the 
standard errors of the coefficients in brackets: ** indicates that the coefficients are 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level or better) fits the trend quite 
well: 
 
Turnout =  38.03  +  2.44*VSPID  -  0.04*VSPID2                     R2 = 0.74 
  (6.34)**  (0.50)**  (0.01)** 
 
The higher the percentage of the electorate expressing a very strong sense of partisanship at 
an election, the higher the turnout, therefore. But as the proportion of very strong partisans 
rises, the quadratic term (VSPID2) shows that diminishing returns set in and the increase in 
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turnout gets smaller (with even a hint of declining turnout setting in again at very high levels 
of partisan intensity). 
 
Even more strikingly, there is a clear time dimension to this non-linearity, with steep 
increases in turnout for increases in the percentage of strong identifiers in the low 
partisanship contests of the post-2000 period, and much less variation in turnout as 
partisanship levels fluctuate in the pre-2000 contests. The interaction between intensity of 
partisanship and the post-2000 dummy variable is both significant and telling (table 1d, 
model III). There is a significant positive relationship between partisanship and turnout after 
2000. But before the millennium, aggregate partisanship had no overall effect on turnout 
(figure 8b). Pushing the analysis further, it is clear that the failure of the partisanship measure 
to have an influence on turnout before 2000 is largely due to the five pre-1979 elections for 
which we have data on partisanship, all of which were marked by relatively high levels of 
partisanship. In the period for which we have data, partisanship among the UK electorate was 
at its strongest in the 1964, 1966 and 1970 contests. And even though dealignment had begun 
by 1974 (Särlvik and Crewe, 1983), it had not yet reached the levels experienced in later 
elections. Restricting the analysis to those elections in which 25% or less of the electorate 
UHSRUWHGLGHQWLI\LQJµYHU\VWURQJO\¶ZLWKDSROLtical party (i.e. to the contests from 1979 to 
2017 inclusive), produces the following regression model: 
 
Turnout =  43.32  +  1.53*VSPID                                    r2 = 0.73 
  (5.73)**  (0.33)** 
 
In other words, there may be a threshold effect in operation. When more than a quarter of the 
electorate felt very strongly attached to a party, aggregate levels of partisan intensity had little 
effect on overall turnout. But once the proportion identifying very strongly with a party fell 
below this level, overall turnout became very sensitive to changing levels of partisanship. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Since the millennium, turnout at UK General Elections has remained stubbornly below the 
levels of the late twentieth century, slow recovery after 2001 notwithstanding. Nevertheless, 
as these analyses demonstrate, aggregate turnout patterns have been shaped by the 
competitiveness of the election. The closer the election, the higher the turnout. That said, the 
2001 election acted as a sRUWRIµUHVHW¶7XUQRXWGURSSHGGUDPDWLFDOO\IURPWKHOHYHOVRIWKH
late twentieth century, and then the long-term relationship between electoral competitiveness 
and turnout re-established itself, albeit at a lower level. 
 
7KHSX]]OHWKHUHIRUHLVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHµUHVHW¶Our analyses of each potential 
argument suggest that (at least in the aggregate) two factors account for variations in national 
turnout levels at UK general elections. Firstly, turnout is higher in closer elections than in less 
competitive ones. And, secondly, once the proportion of voters expressing a strong 
identification with a party drops below around 25%, turnout fluctuates in accord with partisan 
intensity. The latter substantially accounts for the drop-off in overall turnout after 2000. Thus, 
RXUILQGLQJVERWKFRUURERUDWHDQGDGGWR+HDWK¶VLPSRUWDQWUHVXOWVE\LGHQWLI\LQJD
µWKUHVKROGHIIHFW¶IRUWKHHIIHFWRISDUWLVDQLGHQWLILFDWLRQRQWXUQRXW 
 
7KHµUHVHW¶WKHUHIRUHEHJLQVWR look increasingly like an artefact of a less intensively 
partisan electorate. At the aggregate level at least, intensity of partisanship only begins to 
exert an influence on turnout once overall partisanship drops below that threshold ± as it did 
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in 2001. The reason why 25% or so of the electorate identifying as very strong partisans acts 
as a threshold is not clear, but this almost certainly links both to the general climate within 
which people vote (turnout is higher when people think most others in their communities are 
politically engaged: Pattie and Johnston, 2016) and to wider issues around disengagement 
and alienation from political elites (Jennings et al., 2017; Evans and Tilley, 2017). 
 
Recovering turnout rates since 2001 reflect both modest increases in partisan intensity since 
WKHQDQGWKHUHQHZHGFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRIWKH8.¶VJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQVDVWKHGRPLQDQFH
established by New Labour at the turn of the century first declined and then disappeared. By 
2017, General Election turnout had been increasing slowly for 16 unbroken years ± an 
unprecedentedly ORQJSHULRGRIVORZJURZWKDIWHUWKHµWUHQGOHVVIOXFWXDWLRQ¶RIWKH earlier 
post -war decades. In shortWKHWXUQRXWµUHVHW¶appears to be a watershed in UK electoral 
participation. Increasing electoral competitiveness alone will probably not return turnout to 
postwar levels. Achieving that would require not only closer contests but also a return to 
higher levels of partisanship in the electorate. And that, in these sceptical times, looks rather 
unlikely.  
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Figure 1: Average absolute percentage point difference between Conservative and Labour in 
final pre-election polls versus official UK turnout, 1945-2017 
 
 
 
Note: Official UK turnout data are from Rallings and Thrasher (2012) and (for later elections) 
from the UK Electoral Commission. Polling data are from Rallings and Thrasher (2012) and 
IURP$QWKRQ\:HOOV¶UK Polling Report website: http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/. 
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Figure 2: The total number of Conservative-Labour marginal seats at the prior election versus 
official UK turnout, 1959-2017 
 
 
 
 
Note: Official UK turnout data are from Rallings and Thrasher (2012) and (for later elections) 
from the UK Electoral Commission.  The number of Conservative-Labour marginals are 
derived from Curtice (2018, 32). 
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Figure 3: Absolute difference in Conservative-Labour manifesto (left-right) scores versus 
official UK turnout, 1945-2015. 
 
 
 
Note: Manifesto data from Volkens et al. (2017); official UK turnout data are from the 
Electoral Commission. Official UK turnout data are from Rallings and Thrasher (2012) and 
(for later elections) from the UK Electoral Commission. 
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Figure 4: The changing strength of partisan attachments in Britain versus official UK turnout, 
1964-2017. 
 
 
 
Note: Party identification data from the British Election Study face-to-face post-election 
surveys; official UK turnout data are from Rallings and Thrasher (2012) and (for later 
elections) from the UK Electoral Commission. 
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Figure 5: Electoral competitiveness and turnout, 1945-2017 
 
a) All elections 
 
 
b) Differentiating between pre- and post-2000 contests 
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Figure 6: Number of marginals and turnout, 1959-2017 
 
a) All elections 
 
 
b) Differentiating between pre- and post-2000
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Figure 7 Ideological distance and turnout, 1945-2015 
 
a) All elections 
 
 
b) Differentiating between pre- and post-2000 contests 
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Figure 8 Percent with very strong party identifications and turnout, 1964-2017 
 
a) All elections 
 
 
b) Differentiating between pre- and post-2000 contests 
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Table 1: Accounting for national turnout: regression models (standard errors in brackets) 
 
 
 Y = % turnout 
 I II III 
A) Electoral competiveness    
Constant 76.44** 
(2.25) 
79.15** 
(1.12) 
79.18** 
(1.23) 
Abs poll difference, Con vs Lab -0.49+ 
(0.27) 
-0.45** 
(0.13) 
-0.46** 
(0.15) 
Post-2000?  -12.00** 
(1.51) 
-12.19** 
(2.81) 
Post-2000*Abs poll diff interaction   0.03 
(0.34) 
R2 0.15 0.82 0.82 
N 20 20 20 
    
B) Number of Con-Lab marginals, t-1    
Constant 63.54** 
(5.82) 
75.31** 
(3.68) 
72.43** 
(3.03) 
N of, Con-Lab marginals, t-1 0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Post-2000?  -11.20** 
(1.87) 
11.03 
(7.46) 
Post-2000*N C-L marginals, t-1   -0.22* 
(0.07) 
R2 0.13 0.73 0.84 
N 16 16 16 
    
C) Ideological distinctiveness     
Constant 70.22** 
(2.89) 
76.88** 
(1.99) 
77.09** 
(1.98) 
Abs left-right difference, Con vs Lab 0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Post-2000?  -13.69** 
(2.29) 
-22.81* 
(8.14) 
Post-2000*Abs L-R diff interaction   0.58 
(0.49) 
R2 0.09 0.72 0.74 
N 19 19 19 
    
D) Party identification     
Constant 64.34** 
(3.03) 
73.80** 
(2.67) 
74.32** 
(2.27) 
% with very strong party ID 0.28* 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Post-2000?  -10.28** 
(2.11) 
-34.43** 
(10.25) 
Post-2000*VS party ID interaction   1.67* 
(0.70) 
21 
 
R2 0.33 0.78 0.85 
N 15 15 15 
 
+  Significant at p = 0.10 
*  Significant at p = 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
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